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The Challenge of
A Black Presidential
Candidacy (1984)
By Robert C. Smith and Joseph R McCormick, I I
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An Assessment

(First of two parts)
ow effective was Jesse L. Jackson’s
1984 campaign for the Democratic
presidential nomination?
How one evaluates the Jackson
campaign depends on the standards or
criteria employed in the framework of this
analysis. The core of our framework is
found in a set of criteria we advanced in an
earlier essay, “The Challenge of A Black
Presidential Candidacy/’ which was pub
lished in New Directions last year. (See
Vol. 11, April, 1984, pp. 38-43).
In developing the analytic framework for
the first article, we proposed that Jack
son’s candidacy be evaluated on the basis
of its “potential to (1) contribute to the de
velopm ent of an au th entic liberalprogressive agenda and constituency and
(2) its potential to contribute to Black polit
ical empowerment, independence, and
leverage in American electoral politics.1
We wrote:
“Our assessment of the success of the cam
paign is based not on the number of dele
gates obtained, nor on whether the Demo
cratic front-runner or Reagan [is] helped
or hurt, but instead on the nature of Jacksons definition of the Black predicament
and the consequent ideology and policies he
argues are necessary to address that pre
dicament. Also, this assessment is based
on the extent to which Jackson is willing to
challenge the Democratic Party in order to
build an independent base of Black power
in the party system. ”2
Thus, two challenges emerged from
that essay: the challenge of ideology and
the challenge of political independence. On
these two points, we observed, “these are
the fundamental challenges of and to Jackson. The success or failure of his cam
paign, in the final analysis, will be deter
mined on the basis of how he and the party
system meet these challenges.”3
This report, therefore, is a quasisystematic attempt to gauge the impact of

the Jackson campaign on the American
party system and presidential selection
process, and on the strategy and tactics of
Black political empowerment in the United
States.
In addition to these core criteria of
assessment, we also evaluate the impact
of the campaign on Black voter registration
and turnout, and on the outcome of the
Democratic Party nomination and the gen
eral election. In the second part of this
report, we offer some tentative generaliza
tions regarding the long-term effects of the
campaign on the symbolism and structure
of Afro-American community and politics.
This report is a preliminary assessment
— first, because of the tentative and in
complete status of relevant data (the quad
rennial survey of the national election by
the University of Michigan’s Center for
Political Studies is an indispensable source
for systematic assessment of the cam
paign); second, because the effects of
Jackson’s challenge continue to unfold, and
indeed will continue to do so in the months
and years ahead as the Democratic Party’s
constituency groups attempt to chart a
new direction in light of the challenge of
independent Black politics and the continu
ing defection of key white constituency
groups in the 1984 general election.
Black Voter Registration and Turnout
Since the late 1960s, the dominant strat
egy in Black politics has involved participa
tion in the electoral process.4 As a result,
the principal concern of Black leadership
has been to increase the size and leverage
of the Black vote, which is potentially sig
nificant because of its size (more than 10%
of the national electorate), its concentra
tion in the large cities and states and be
cause it is usually highly cohesive. But the
fact that Blacks vote at a lower rate than
whites seriously undermines the actual
significance of the vote. Since 1964, the
percentage of Blacks of voting age who ac

tually voted has declined by 8%, from 59%
in 1964 to 51% in 1980, while among white
voters it declined from 71% to 61%.5 Thus,
a major goal of Black American leadership
has been to halt and reverse this decline in
Black voter participation and narrow the
approximately 10% gap in Black and white
voting rates.
This goal of increased Black registration
and voting was also a primary goal of the
Jackson campaign. Jackson argued that
Blacks were more likely to register and
vote if they had a credible Black candidate
to vote for, and those Black voters added
to the rolls during the primary campaign
could be a powerful force in supporting the
Democratic nominee in his effort to unseat
President Ronald Reagan, and in contribut
ing to the election of Blacks and progres
sive whites at the state and local level in
1984 and beyond.
As Jackson himself wrote in the Wash
ington Post: “Eighteen million eligible
Black voters can be the cornerstone of a
new ‘coalition of the rejected’ (the real si
lent majority) that can create new political
options for 1984.”6 During his “Southern
Crusade” in the summer of 1983, Jackson
joined with other Black organizations (Op
eration Big Vote, the NAACP and the A.
Phillip Randolph Institute) in a coordinated
campaign to increase Black voter registra
tion. And this effort resulted in a significant
increase in Black registration and voting in
the primaries, especially in the South.
(See Table 1.) Overall, 695,000 Blacks
were added to the voter rolls in southern
states prior to the Democratic primaries,
while among whites there was a net loss of
227,000 voters. Thus, between 1980 and
the spring of 1984, Black voter registration
in the South increased by 8.5% while white
registration declined by nearly 10%.
Similar voter registration figures are not
available outside the South. However, ob
servers in major urban centers of the
North — New York, Chicago, Los AngeNEW DIRECTIONS APR IL 1985
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les, Philadelphia and Baltimore— indicate
there was a similar upsurge in Black regis
tration in the period leading up to the
Democratic primaries. In addition, in a
survey conducted by the Gallup organiza
tion for the Washington-based Joint Center
for Political Studies, 7% of a sample of the
national Black community’s voting age
population reported registering since
1982, compared to 4% of voting age
whites; 65% of the Black respondents re
ported that Jackson’s campaign had made
them more likely to vote.7 Therefore, ac26 cording to available data, a significant in
crease in Black voter registration has oc
curred. The data also indicate that Jack
son’s campaign may, at least in part, be
responsible for this development.8
he increased Black voter registra
tion apparently translated into in
creased Black voter turnout in the
Democratic primaries. Indeed, it is
probable that for the first time in the his
tory of the Democratic Party’s nomination
process Black Americans voted in the
primaries at a greater rate than white
Americans. (See Table 2.) The turnout in
selected Democratic primaries in 1984
shows that in every state it was greater in
“Black areas” than in the state as a whole.
Increased Black turnout from 1980 to 1984
ranged from 14% in Georgia to 127% in
New York State. This compares to an
overall increase in Democratic primary
voting of 4% between 1980 and 1984. This
massive increase in Black participation in
the Democratic primaries must be attribu
ted, in large measure, to the enthusiasm
generated by Jackson’s campaign.

T

The increased Black registration and
voting during the primaries apparently was
not as widespread in the November gen
eral election. In the South, during the
period after the party conventions, Blacks
continued to register at a higher rate than
whites but the resulting additions to the
voter rolls were not as favorable to Black
voter interests, given the respective popu
lation bases of whites and Blacks in the
general electorate when compared to the
Democratic Party electorate. For exam
ple, in Georgia in the post convention
period, Black registration increased by
15.6%, compared to an increase of 9.7% in
white registration. But these percentages
translated into an increase of 170,211 new
white voters, compared to 74,485 new
Black voters. Similarly in Louisiana, a
11.4% Black increase in registration
NEW DIRECTIONS APRIL 1985

yielded 14,525 new voters while a more
m odest 6.6% white increase yielded
40,844 new white voters.9 As a result, al
though the Democratic Party and its con
stituent groups— including Blacks— were
able to increase Black registration, a simi
lar effort by the Republican Party and its
constituent groups — especially the white
southern evangelical church — were able
with less proportionate success to in
crease the white vote and in effect cancel
the impact of the much greater proportion
ate success of the Black registration ef
fort.
Nevertheless, Black voters did consti
tute a larger proportion of the newly regis
tered voters in 1984 and a larger propor
tion of the general electorate as a whole.

“The most basic explana
tion for the failure of the
Black vote to play the
anticipated balance of
power role was the land
slide character of Presi
dent Reagan’s victory. ”
The New York Times-CBS News election
day exit poll found that 12% of Black vot
ers, compared to 8% of white voters, were
casting ballots for the first tim e.10 And the
Washington P ost-kB C News exit poll
found that Blacks constituted 10% of the
electorate in November, an increase of 1%
from the 1980 general election.11
Overall, however, in contrast to Black
voter participation in the 1984 primaries
where there was a significant and influen
tial upsurge, in the general election the
picture is mixed. The Joint Center esti
mates that Black turnout in the general
election increased in the South by 5.3%
over the 1980 figure, but that there was
little or no increase among Blacks outside
of the South.12 Consequently, the expec
tation of Jesse Jackson and other Black
political leaders that increased Black voter
registration might alter the electoral col
lege balance in favor of the Democratic
ticket did not materialize.
The most basic explanation for the fail
ure of the Black vote to play the anticipated
balance of power role was the landslide
character of President Reagan’s victory. In

addition, Black voters, for a variety of rea
sons— the Democratic candidates’ lack of
attention to Black policy concerns during
the fall campaign, disappointment and dis
affection among some Black voters as a
result of Jackson’s defeat and the percep
tion among some Black voters as well that
Jackson and his constituency were not
fairly treated by the Democratic Party and
its nominees— did not vote in the Novem
ber election in the numbers Jackson ex
pected his candidacy to generate.
The Democratic Primaries and
Caucuses
Jesse Jackson announced his candidacy on
November 3, 1983, much later than all of
the other candidates. This late start re
sulted in a good deal of confusion and lack
of coordination in the early stages of the
campaign’s organization.
Jackson’s organization was composed of
longtime associates of his Chicago-based
Operation PUSH and a range of outside
politicians, clergymen and academicians
(including some Howard University faculty
members: Professor Ronald Walters of the
Political Science Department as deputy
campaign manager for issues and strategy
development; Robert Browne of the Afri
can Studies and Research Program and
Mary Berry, professor of history and law,
as senior policy advisors).
In structure— field operations, schedul
ing, fundraising, press, issue develop
ment, legal counsel, etc. — the Jackson
campaign organization was similar to that
of other recent presidential campaigns,
with most decision-making authority cen
tered in the candidate and a few of his
closest aides. There were, however, sev
eral distinctive features of the Jackson
campaign organization.
irst, unlike most presidential cam
paigns that rely on state and local
political organizations and/or estab
lished and experienced operatives
from previous presidential campaigns,
Jackson’s core, grassroots organizational
base was the Black church and its national
network of clergy. The Black church and
clergy were a source of both financial and
organizational support throughout the
campaign. If Jackson had not been able to
draw on this national netw ork of
preachers, it is doubtful he could have sus
tained a national campaign for nearly 10
months, especially given the relative ab
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sence of more traditional sources of cam
paign support.
A second distinctive characteristic of
the Jackson campaign was the “constitu
ency desk s.” The constituency desks
were a part of the campaign’s effort to build
a multi-ethnic and multi-issue coalition.
Thus, the campaign included full-time
coordinators for key constituent elements
of the Rainbow Coalition.
Although Jackson made a systematic or
ganizational effort to reach beyond the
Black community to other constituencies,
a third distinctive feature of his campaign
was its outreach to the range of ideological
persuasions within the Black community
itself. Jackson was able to bring into the
political process, for the first time, mem
bers of the Nation of Islam, a group that on
ideological and philosophical grounds had
long eschewed participation in the estab
lished American political process. This, in
part, explains Jackson’s controversial
campaign relationship with Minister Louis
Farrakhan. Looking back on the continu
ous relationship between Malcolm X and
Martin Luther King in the 1960s, Jackson
told Lerone Bennett of Ebony magazine:
“That is why I keep reaching out. You see,
before, historically, we did not spiritually
unify Blacks of different ideological per
suasions . . . This time we've involved the
Nationalists, whether its Herb Daughtery
or Farrakhan. We are molding our com
munity together. Now those who seek to
gain from division in our community have
done everything to break that up. The price
we pay for expansion into the broader com
munity cannot be the disintegration of our
community. That costs too much. We don't
support a white candidate based upon the
behavior of all of his white supporters. 13
Jackson’s late start and relatively inex
perienced staff also affected the financing
of the campaign— a campaign without ac
cess to large institutional or individual con
tributions. The Jackson campaign needed
extensive prior fund raising activity if it
were to qualify for federal matching funds,
which require a candidate to receive at
least $5,000 in each of 20 states with a
maximum contribution of $250 per indi
vidual by check or money order. Given this
disadvantage, Jackson’s campaign relied on
television debate parties, concerts and
“passing the plate” at rallies and during
church services. These efforts resulted in
substantial cash contributions which,
under the federal law, did not qualify for
federal matching funds. Thus, the Jackson

campaign, compared to his principal com ancial disadvantages, Jackson was re
petitors, was handicapped by a shortage of markably successful in the Democratic
funds and a near constant cash flow prob primaries and caucuses. In a field of eight
lem.
nationally known Democratic politicians,
An examination of campaign contri Jackson was able to survive the long tortu
butions and disbursements of the principal ous process of more than 50 primaries and
Democratic candidates shows the dispar caucuses and end up as one of the three
ity between the Jackson campaign and final contenders for the nomination. He
those of his two major opponents. Federal won, for example, the majority of the vote
Election Commission data show that as of in the District of Columbia, Louisiana, Vir
August 31, 1984, Vice President Walter ginia and South Carolina. In addition, JackMondale’s campaign spent $32,852,724, son won the urban vote, carrying such
Senator Gary H art’s $22,175,047 and cities as Philadelphia, Newark Atlanta,
Jesse Jackson’s $6,669,026. Indeed, the Little Rock, New Orleans, St. Louis,
Election Commission data show that Jack- Charleston, Chicago and New York. (See
son raised and spent less than all of the Table 3.)
The data show that Jackson’s fundamen
eight candidates, except Senators Ernest
tal
base of support was in the Black com
Hollings and George McGovern and Govmunity. In the early primaries in Alabama
and Georgia, Jackson received 50% and
60% of the Black vote and less than 1% of
“Jackson’s support in the the white vote, with Mondale receiving the
vast majority of the remaining Black vote.
Black community cut
However, as the primary season devel
across all demographic
oped, Jackson’s percentage of the Black
vote steadily increased until he was receiv
categories. ”
ing 75-85% of the total vote, while his per
centage of the white vote did not in any
state exceed 10%.
Nationwide, it is estimated that Jackson
received 85% of the votes cast by Black
voters during the primaries. Thus, in spite
of the rhetoric of the campaign about a
multi-ethnic Rainbow Coalition, the Jackernor Rubin Askew. (Two other candi
son Campaign was fundamentally a Black
dates, John Glenn and Alan Cranston,
candidacy rooted in the Black community’s
dropped out early in the spring while Jackson campaigned through the July conven historic quest for political empowerment
and racial justice.14
tion.)
This financial disparity seriously handi
ackson’s support in the Black com
capped Jackson’s candidacy because, un
munity cut across all demographic
like his opponents, Jackson was unable to
categories. In the early southern
afford a paid media advertising campaign.
Thus, he could not present a coherent
primaries, young and rural Blacks
image and agenda to the electorate, rather were slightly more favorable to Jackson
he had to rely on regular media coverage.
than older and urban Blacks. However, by
In a presidential campaign, the bulk of the end of the primary season, as the cam
campaign expenditures are for the prepa paign picked up momentum and began to
ration and marketing of television advertis take on the characteristics of a movement,
ing. In the Jackson campaign, the largest Jackson started receiving support from all
expenditures were for travel, staff support strata of the community.15
and fund raising. To the extent, therefore,
Although he received less than 10% of
that effective competition in presidential the white primary vote, of the 3.4 million
politics requires an extensive and expen votes cast for Jackson, an estimated 22%
sive media campaign, Jackson was not at all (737,800) were from whites. The largest
competitive. As he quipped during the white vote for Jackson was cast in Califor
campaign, “If Hart or Mondale had my nia where he received 9% or 285,000
budget, they could not compete. And if I votes. Among Hispanics, Jackson received
had their budgets they could not com 33% of the Puerto Rican vote in New York
pete.”
and 17% of the Mexican-American vote in
In spite of these organizational and fin California. Among Asian-Americans, it is

J
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estimated that Jackson received 25% of
the vote in New Jersey and 20% in Califor
nia. Also, Arab-Americans voted for Jackson in overwhelming numbers; he re
ceived 5% of the Jewish vote in New York
and 8% in California.
Overall, Jackson received 18% of the
Democratic primary vote, Mondale 39%
and Hart 36%. But in the allocation of the
delegates, Jackson received a dispro
portionate 9% while Mondale received
49% and Hart 36% of the delegates.16 This
was due to the Democratic Party’s Hunt
28 Commission rules that were put into effect
a year or so prior to the opening primaries.
The manifest purpose of the rules was to
advantage well organized candidates with
traditional party support and disadvantage
insurgent, minority (political, not racial)
candidates.
Under the rules’ “threshold” provision,
a candidate, in order to receive any dele
gates in a particular congressional district,
had to receive a minimum share of the vote
(generally 20%) in that congressional dis
trict and a similar share of the statewide
vote in order to receive any delegates. In
addition, so called “winner take all,” “win
ner take more” and other “bonus” provi
sions of the rules operated to further de
prive Jackson of the share of the delegates
he earned on the basis of his popular vote
in the primaries and caucuses.
Jackson and his supporters vigorously
challenged these rules throughout the
campaign to no avail. As a result, Mondale
received the nomination with a majority of
convention delegates, although he re 
ceived only a minority of the votes cast by
Democrats who voted in the primaries and
caucuses. Under a different set of rules,
more nearly approximating one man, one
vote, Jackson would have received about
twice the number of delegates, Mondale
considerably less, and Hart’s share prob
ably would have been little changed. As a
consequence, the Democratic Convention
probably would have been deadlocked and
Jesse Jackson’s bargaining power and
leverage at the convention substantially
enhanced.
The Democratic Party, as a result of
Jackson’s protests, established a so-called
“Fairness Commission” to consider re
writing the delegate allocation rules prior
to the 1988 election.18
The Challenge of Ideology
Jesse Jackson’s campaign may be cred
ited with some success in increasing Black
NEW DIRECTIONS APRIL 1985

registration and voting, and in mobilizing
the Black community in support of his can
didacy. However, Jackson’s candidacy, we
believe, failed to meet the challenge of
ideology in large part because he elected
to challenge the party on electoral rules
and procedures rather than on issues and
ideology.
In settin g forth the challenge of
ideology, we argued that it was imperative
that a Black presidential candidate develop
and articulate a liberal-progressive agenda
in order to (1) counteract the conservative
drift of the Democratic Party, a conserva
tive drift pushed by right wing southern
Democrats and (2) because such an agenda
is necessary to address the fundamental
social and economic problems confronting
the Afro-American community.19
Although we did not attempt to develop
in detail the items that constitute what we
called the “unfinished agenda of American
liberalism, ” the following were set forth as
a minimalist’s program: (1) full employ
ment, (2) education reform, (3) national
health insurance, (4) military reform and
defense reductions, (5) welfare reform, (6)
industrial policy and (7) affirmative ac
tion.20 We argued, further, that the “cen
tral item on this agenda is the development
of a comprehensive set of policies de
signed to achieve full employment in a rela
tively short period of time [because] long
term and persistent unemployment is the
major causal factor in the development of
the Black underclass and the ‘tangle of
pathologies’ (female headed households,
crime, drug addiction, welfare depend
ency, alcoholism, etc.) that characterize
this part of the Black community.”21
Although Jackson’s official campaign
agenda or platform titled “A New Direc
tion” addressed each of the items on our
liberal agenda — with special emphasis on
employment and industrial policy — in a
serie s of well reasoned and feasible
planks, 22 in his press conferences, debate
appearances and stump speeches he un
fortunately elected to emphasize reform of
party rules and electoral procedures
rather than substantive policy m atters.28
Christopher Edley, in a Washington
Post essay, wrote: “Reading the recent
press reports one might be led to believe
that Jackson is running for President in
order to reform the Democratic Party,
rather than to preach and teach. Yet for
me, at least, the chief attraction of his can
didacy was the promise of adding color to

the policy debate. A brawl over rules is
dangerously diverting. ” 24
Jackson’s focus on the Democratic Party
rules regarding delegate allocation is to
some extent understandable since he be
lieved, correctly, that the Hunt Commis
sion rules unfairly deprived his constit
uency of fair and equitable representation
at the party convention and thereby de
prived him of bargaining power and lever
age in convention decision-making with re
spect to the party nominees and plat
form.25
Jackson’s focus on abolition of the sec
ond primary, an issue that he at one point
labeled a “litmus test” for his support of
the party and its nominee, is less under
standable. The second primary— the pro
cedure employed in the southern states
requiring a second or a run-off election if
no candidate receives a majority in a
multi-candidate race— apparently became
a matter of concern to Jackson as a result
of his “Southern Crusade” the year before
he announced his candidacy. During this
“crusade” to register and empower south
ern Blacks, Jackson was told by a number
of Black leaders (especially in Mississippi)
that the second primary was a major ob
stacle to effective Black political empow
erment in the region. As a result, Jackson
decided to make abolition of the second
primary (and associated discriminatory
procedures employed in the South, such as
gerrymandering, at-large elections, dual
registration and single shot voting) the
major issue focus of the campaign.
There is considerable debate among
historians, political scientists, journalists,
legal scholars and politicians regarding the
origins and consequences of the second
primary and the probable effects of its abo
lition on southern politics and Black politi
cal empowerment.26 But the merits of the
issue notwithstanding, we believe that it
was a fundam ental strategic error for
Jackson to elevate this problem to the
status of the “litmus test” issue of the
campaign because of its predictable effect
of shifting media attention away from the
employment crisis in the Black commu
nity, a crisis which should have been the
litmus test issue of the campaign.
he result was that the ideological
challenge of the campaign was
blurred, leaving mass opinion with
the impression that the purpose of
Jackson’s candidacy was to abolish the
second primary, reform the Democratic
Party or perhaps secure a homeland for
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White registration
State

Black registration
Change

1984

1980

1980

1984

Change

Alabama

1,700.000

1,664,000

-

36,000

350,000

482,000

+132,000

Arkansas

1,056,000

964,000

-

92,000

130,000

155,000

+ 25,000

Florida

4,331,000

4,337,000

+

6,000

489,000

517,000

+ 28,000

Georgia

1,800,000

1,787,000

-

13,000

450,000

512,000

+ 62,000

Louisiana

1,550,000

1,609,000

-

8,000

465,000

535,000

+ 70,000

N. Carolina

2,314,000

2,369,000

+ 55,000

440,000

565,000

+125,000

S. Carolina

916,000

848,000

- 68,000

320,000

331,000

+ 11,000

Tennessee

2,200,000

2,082,000

-118,000

300,000

348,000

+ 48,000

Texas

6,020,000

6,042.000

-

22,000

620,000

720,000

+100,000

Virginia

1,942,000

1,908,000

-

34,000

360,000

378,000

+ 18,000

TOTAL

24,981,000

24,754,000

-227,000

4,254,000

4,949,000

+695,000

SOURCE: American Political Report and the Voter Education Project as reported in Focus 12 Oune 1984): 9. The figures are for the period
through April. 1984.

Black areas*

State

State total

Alabama

+ 87%

+71%

Florida

+ 38

+ 7

Georgia

+ 14

-3 4

Illinois

+ 19

+37

New York

+ 127

+37

Pennsylvania

+ 32

-

Tennessee

+ 58

+ 7

Indiana

+ 29

+ 17

2

Maryland

+ 33

+ 1

North Carolina

+ 53

+18

Ohio

+ 36

+21

New Jersey

+ 82

+ 19

*Black Areas are precincts in which Blacks comprise 80% or more of the population.

Alabama
Georgia
Illinois
New York

BLACKS

WHITES

Mon dale Jackson Glenn Hart

Mondale Jackson Glenn Hart

50%

1%

1%

29%

1%

32%

37%

30

61

1

5

32

1

25

38

17

79

47%

4

-

4

47

45

3

57

6

-

36

51

2

-

43

8

87

Tennessee

18

77

Indiana

20

71

9

44

3

-

51

Maryland

13

83

1

53

5

-

35

-

2

North Carolina

13

84

1

46

3

-

41

Ohio

15

81

3

44

5

-

50

California

16

78

5

40

9

-

48

New Jersey

11

86

2

56

4

-

38

"The states are listed in the order that their primaries occurred.
SOURCE: New York Times — CBS News Exit Polls.

related aspect of the challenge of
ideology was to prevent the Demo
cratic Party, its nominees and plat
form, from shifting to the right — a
shift in strategy for the party that was ar
ticulated in a series of speeches and arti
cles by, among others, Bert Lance and
Hamilton Jordan, proteges of former Pres
ident Jimmy Carter. The leading right-ofcenter candidate in early 1984 was Senator
John Glenn, who in the early polls led or
was in a respectable second place to Vice
President Mondale. (The other right-ofcenter candidates in the Dem ocratic
primaries were former Florida Governor
Rubin Askew and South Carolina Senator
Ernest Hollings.)
This aspect of the challenge of ideology
was met, we believe, since the more con
servative candidates for the nomination
were eliminated early in the primary proc
ess. The Jackson campaign, however, had
relatively little effect on this outcome. This
is because Blacks, the largest and indeed
the core liberal constituency in the Demo
cratic Party and Jackson’s candidacy, effec
tively deprived the more liberal candidates
(Mondale, McGovern, Hart and Cranston)

A

SOURCE: Thomas Cavanagh and Lorn Foster, Jesse Jackson's Campaign: The. Primaries and Caucuses (Washington: Joint Center for Political
Studies, 1984): 17.

State*

the Palestinians in Palestine. This distor
tion of the ideological purposes of the cam
paign was inevitable, given the complexity
of the second primary issue, the tendency
of the media to focus on trivia and the
pseudo-dramatic (as the coverage of the
“Hymie” and Farrakhan controversies il
lustrate) and Jackson’s inability, for finan
cial reasons, to present his own campaign
agenda through a paid advertising cam
paign.
Jackson’s failure to pursue issue clarity
is also demonstrated by examination of the
four minority planks presented for debate
at the Democratic Convention. Two of the
planks — affirmative action and reduction
in military expenditures — correspond to
our liberal agenda. The other issues pre
sented— the second primary and adoption
by the United States of a policy of “no first
use” of nuclear weapons — did not. (The
plank on nuclear weapons was an effort by
Jackson to appeal to the peace constit
uency.) Again, the effect of the debate on
the four planks during the convention was
to leave the campaign without a sharp
ideological edge.27 In our view, Jackson
would have better served his constituency
and the strategic purposes of the campaign
had he presented to the convention for de
bate a single issue — a well-crafted pro
gram for full employment.
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of their support. But Vice President Mon that the party would not move in a sharp
dale, a traditional liberal, was able to elim right wing direction, its San Francisco plat
inate his more conservative opponents in form is arguably the most conservative in a
spite of Jackson’s dominance of the liberal generation.29 The bulk of the platform
Black vote. Mondale’s nomination can consists of a series of long partisan attacks
probably be accounted for in terms of a on the domestic and foreign policy record
number of factors specific to the 1984 of the Reagan Administration, and on the
nomination process.
specifics of the liberal agenda— a series of
First, Mondale had the support of virtu vague generalities.30
On the question of employment, the
ally the entire Democratic Party estab
lishment — labor, Jews, liberals and the party refused to reaffirm its commitment
majority of state and county party leaders. to a full employment economy or propose
Second, Mondale had a better campaign specific policies to significantly reduce the
organization than his rivals. Third, Mon unemployment rate. There was no men
dale’s campaign was b e tte r financed. tion of national health insurance or welfare
Fourth, the Hunt Commission rules fa reform, traditional items in the party’s plat
vored a well organized, establishment type forms. And on defense spending, rather
candidate such as Mondale. Fifth, Jack than repudiating the unprecedented Reason’s candidacy notwithstanding, Mondale
received significant support from Blacks,
among them a number of mayors, mem
“Jackson would have
bers of Congress and Atlanta’s influential
King family. Finally, regarding the early
better served his consti
elimination of Mondale’s more conserva
tuency and the strategic
tive opponents, the outcome of the 1984
Democratic primaries indicate that mod
purposes of the campaign
erately conservative candidates can com
had he presented to the
mand only a fraction of the party’s pres
idential electorate.
convention for debate a
It has been clear at least since 1972 that
single issue— a wellthe Democratic Party has shifted to the
liberal center, in part as a result of the
crafted program for full
realignment of the two parties’ core con
employment. ”
stitu en cies since the 1964 election.
Senator Gary Hart’s second place finish in
the 1984 Democratic primaries further
supports this conclusion. Although on the gan build-up, the platform proposed only a
basis of some of his demographic support modest slowdown in the rate of growth in
(young and upwardly mobile white urban military outlays.
Overall, while the Democratic platform
professionals or what the press boorishly
labeled “Yuppies”) and ill-informed press was not a conservative document, neither
coverage, Hart was frequently viewed as a was it a traditional liberal one. Rather, it
conservative, especially in the Black was a centrist document that sought to ac
community. However, a report by two commodate the apparent conservative
political science professors at Howard mood of the middle class white elector
found “significant common ground and ate.31 And, consistent with the platform,
mutuality of interests” on domestic issues Mondale’s fall campaign was characterized
between Hart’s “neoliberal” agenda and by a cautious moderation, emphasizing
Jackson’s “Black” agenda.28
fiscal austerity, tax increases and a bal
anced budget. Put simply, the left-liberal
he outcom e of the D em ocratic challenge of a Black presidential candidacy
nom ination was a trium ph for was met by a cautious but clear movement
□
liberalism in the sense that the more from the left of center.
conservative candidates were elimi
nated early in the process and the three
top vote getters were all representatives
of the party’s liberal wing — Mondale the
traditional liberal, Hart the neoliberal and Robert C. Smith and Joseph P. McCormick, II are
faculty members of the Department of Political Sci
Jackson the insurgent left-liberal.
ence at Howard University. The second part of their
Although Mondale’s nomination assured report will appear in our July issue.
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